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Pari-Mutuel as a System of Aggregation
of Information
1. The Individual Bettor
Let us consider the problem faced by a bettor at a race
track. There are n horses, with (subjective) probabilities
P , p ,...,p of winning. He has A dollars to bet on these
horses, and a bet of x dollars on horse j will return x/q .
dollars if that horse wins. (The x/q . includes the bettor's
original x dollar bet.) It is assumed that the p. and a
3 3






(2) £ q.= l ; g i
3 = 1
Condition (1) means the bettor's subjective probabilities
are consistent; condition (2) means the payoff odds are fair.
(Though, in fact, they seldom are, and most bookies will normally
announce odds such that \ q . is substantially greater than
1, i.e., they pay less than a "fair" system would.)
The bettor has a utility function u for money; it will be
assumed that u is monotone non-decreasing and continuous. The
bettor's problem, then, is to choose his bets, x ,...,xn , so as to




p . U ( -3- - B + A \ .
where
n
(4) b = ^ x .
3=1
subject to
(5) b < A
(6) x . > .
J
The first thing we notice is that, assuming the fairness
conditions (2), the bettor might as well set B = A, i.e. bet all
his available funds. In fact, suppose we had B < a. We could
then set e = A - B , and

















so that f(x') = F(x), i.e. the bettor can do at least as well with
bets x .' such that b' = a as with any other bets with b < a.
We simplify the problem, then, to one of maximizing
(? ) ^(x x ) = y p . u (1±1 n y 3 \q.
subject to
(8) J,-
(9) x . > .
J
Assuming differentiability of u, the first-order conditions
for optimality will be
(10a) -2- u> [-2.]= x if x . > o
Pi(10b) -^- w (0) < \ if x . =
where X is a Lagrange multiplier representing the marginal utility
of money.
In case u is not dif ferent iable at the point x./q., conditions
J J
(10) must be modified, in terms of the right-hand and left-hand
derivatives of u to give
Now (10a) can be rewritten as
In the simplest case, all x. are positive, so that (10a) holds for
all j. Adding with respect to j , we have, by (2)
(12) X - £ P, *' ^
j j
so that X is simply the expected value of u '
.
More generally, of course, (12) does not hold for all j, and
so we can only state that X is at least equal to the expected
value of u '
.
In case u is concave, the first-order conditions (10) are
sufficient for optimality. We rewrite these as








(14) u' (0) < ^_± if x . =
P
J
Using the fact that u' is monotone non-increasing (for concave
u)
,




k p i pk(15) -^- > — whenever —<*- > —
q j qk q j qk
with the stronger result that, for strictly concave u, (15) holds
even if the second inequality is loose.
Thus, a discrepancy between the bettor's subjective probabilitie
and the payoff odds leads the bettor to bet so that his conditional
winnings will be greater for horses for which the ratio P-/q.
is greater, and conversely.
Conditions (13) and (14) are meaningful if both p. and q.
are positive. In case p = 0, q. > 0, it is easily seen that
optimality requires x. = 0, i.e. never bet on a horse which
(subjectively) has no chance of winning. It is not clear what
happens if g. = o, though in practice it is difficult to imagine
a situation in which infinite odds were offered. In case p. =
J
q. = 0, we imagine the bettor will still set x. = , in case
P. > q. = 0, however, we seem to reach some sort of contradiction.
We note, then that q. = o leads to contradictions which would best
be avoided; among other things, the payoff functions are discontinuous
or fail to exist here.
In case u is strictly concave, we may use the inverse function
w m (W)' 1 and (13) - (14) now take the form
(16) „. . 9j „(^i) if „(ifl) > o
(17) x . = if w I—
i
J
Condition (8) can be restated as
Xg
J
(is) , - ^ q . » (^i
where the prime on the summation svmbol means that it should con-
sider only those j such that (16) holds, i.e. such that
(19) \q . < p . W (0
)
The right side (18) can be seen to be a monotone non-increasing
function of \ and thus (18) can be solved, numerically or
analytically, for A. This presumably solves the single bettor's
problem.
2. The Equilibrium Odds
In general , bookies tend to be risk-averse and seek to set
payoff odds in such a way as to eliminate the possibility of loss.
Of course, a bookie is not bound by the fairness condition (2),
so that, in practice, the sum of the q. is greater than 1. If
(2) were to be enforced, however (perhaps under cutthroat competi-
tion among bookies), the bookie could only eliminate the risk of
loss if the amounts bet on the several horses were proportional
to the q . , i.e. if
(20) b . = q . c
J J
where b . is the total amount bet on horse j (by all bettors) and
c is the total amount of all wagers.
If there is only one bettor, it is easy to see that this can
he accomplished by setting q. = p.. For then x. = q. a will
J J J J
satisfy conditions (10) (with A = u'(A)). In case u is strictly
concave, moreover, this is the bettor's unique optimum, so that
q. = p. gives rise to an equilibrium. (Clearly, with one bettor,
b
.
= x . and c = A ) .
J J
If there are two or more bettors, the bookie must look for
some way of combining the several bettors' subjective probabilities
so as to avoid risk. At a race track, this is normally accomplished
by a pari-mutuel system, which simply sets q. = b./c, so that (20)
is automatically achieved, after the amounts bet are known. In
effect, the players bet against each other, with the track as
intermediary. This has the disadvantage - from the players' point
of view - that bets are made with only partial knowledge of the
payoff odds. Thus, a player might well feel he would have changed
his bets, had he known the true payoff odds in advance. Of course
such a change would in turn cause the q. to change, leading to a
further change in bets, et sic ad infinitum
,
or at least until
some equilibrium is reached. The question is whether such an
equilibrium exists.
Assume, then, m bettors. Bettor i (i = 1,..., m) has a
subjective probability distribution (p.., p. 2 ,..., p. ) satisfying
p . . > , and
I >v - ' .
j = l
This same bettor has a sum of money, a., available for betting,
and a utility function for money, u
.
. If the odds are posted as
(<7
7
' <?-,/•••/? ), then each bettor will choose (x , x ,..., x. )
so as to maximize his expected utility, as discussed above. Total
bets on horse j are then
m
(2D b . = y x .
.
i = l
and the total amount bet on all horses is
m n
b
.(22) C = 1 *i' 1 J
i=l J=J
There will be an equilibrium if (20) holds for all j.
As was mentioned above, difficulties arise if q . = for
J
any j. We will therefore try to avoid this, and will specifically
rule out such equilibria. We make then the following assumption.
Assumption z . For every j, there is some i such that p. . >
We prove the existence of equilibrium under the further
assumption that the utility functions are strictly concave.
Essentially, this uses a fixed-point theorem. Some care must
however be used to avoid the possibility that the fixed point
lies on the boundary of the simplex.
Theorem 1 . Suppose Assumption z holds, and suppose more-
over that all the utility functions are strictly concave. Then
there is an equilibrium n-tuple of payoff odds, q .* > 0.
Proof : Let Q be the unit /i-simplex, i.e. the set of
vectors (g ,..., q ) satisfying (2). Let Q be the interior of
Q (the set of q with all components positive) and let 9£> be the
boundary of Q (the set of q with at least one q. = 0.)
o *For q c Q , consider bettor i's optimal choice of bets.
As discussed above, it cannot be optimal for him to bet on a
horse with no chance of winning, so his bets must satisfy, not
just (8) and (9), but also the condition x., = o whenever p., =ik ik




\. (x. f q) = ) p. . U . ( —i i t-d i 7 i \ a
is strictly concave, and so has a unique maximizing vector,
x
i
*(q). Since f is continuous for all x. and all q e Q° , it
will follow that x.*(q) is continuous for q e Q° .
Let , now,
m
b*(q) = y x.*(q)
i=l
Then b* is a continuous mapping from q° into iR n . Let, finally,




Clearly, J assigns to each q € Q a non-empty subset of
n = \l, 2,..., n\ . By the continuity of b* , J is upper semi-
continuous .
Next, for q e dQ , define
J(q) = | J q j
= o\
.
Since q e dQ, J(q) is non-empty here also. Trivially, it is upper
semi-continuous if restricted to dQ
.
In this way, the mapping j is defined over the entire simplex
Q. We wish to show it is upper semi-continuous, i.e. if q—»§
and j e J(q), then j e J(q).
In this, we can dispense with the case in which q e Q , since
such q can only be approached through q e Q , and we know j, res-
tricted to I? , is semi-continuous. Similarly, we can dispense
with the case that q—-q, with all q and q e dQ, since we know
J, restricted to dQ , is semi-continuous.
It remains to consider the case in which q -g with q e Q
and q e dQ . Let k = J(q). We must show that, for q sufficiently
Close to q , J(q) <= K
Take some (fixed) k e K : we have q = . By assumption z,
K.
there is some bettor, b, with p > o. Keeping h fixed, let L (q)
be the set of all j for which p, ./a. is maximal.
Suppose q. > 0. As q g, the ratio p,,/q. increases withoutj nk x.
bound, whereas p ./q . approaches the finite limit, p, /a . Thusn J J ftj J
j \ l(q), and we conclude there exists c > such that, if
Let r be the minimum of all a . such that q . > . Let
J 3
z = r/2 . Then, for all g such that \q - g| < z and all j i K,
we will have q. > r/2.
J
Let s be the minimum of all p, . such that a . = and p L . >
Since u is strictly increasing and concave, we know u ' (y + ) >




Let now e be the smallest of z , z , z
3 ,
and z . Assume
q e Q , \q - q\ < z. We will show J(q) c K.
Let x * (q) be bettor h's optimal response to the payoff odds
q, and suppose x .* > q./2 for some j k K. Let £ e l(q). Since










h£ and x are both positive, and so we can apply (13) to
set
*
V ('M\ -iLlhl v ( x-m
Now, since lg - g| < e, we will have q. > r/2, q. < z and
10
* 1Also, p.. < 1. Finally, x,./g. > — , so by monotonicity
v ( xAi\ * v <j>- Thus
and, using the definition of e





Clearly, £>,i > X * , and so b q / q * > 2
*
On the other hand, for any k 4 K, b < c and q > r/2. Thus
and we see that k i J(g) . We conclude that J(q) c k.
*
Suppose, on the other hand, there is no j, j 4 k, with x. > q./2
In this case,
j i X j t K
and so
.
* 1Thus there is some I a K with x, n > =—hi 2n .
Since
| q - q | < e^ and q. = 0, we have q. < E and so
'Z ^
X h/ > i = 2C
11
Once again b.*/q. < 2c/r for all j 4 K, and so b*/q. < b»*/q.
Thus we conclude once that J(q) c k.
We see then that J is an upper semi-continuous mapping,
assigning a non-empty subset of N to each q c Q. Define, now,




q . = if j £ S > .
J
)
Clearly, $ is an upper semi-continuous mapping from the sub-
setsof n to Q. The composition, * = <j>oJ, is then an upper semi-
continuous mapping assigning a non-empty, closed convex subset of
Q to each q e q . By the Kakutani fixed-point theorem, such a
mapping must have a fixed point, i.e. there is q e Q, such that
q e $ (q ) .
Clearly q* k dQ since, for q c dQ , J (q) consists of those
indices j with q . = 0, and so §(q) will consist of those vectors
z e Q such that z . = whenever q . > 0. Thus q* e 0° . But, if
q* r q , the only s c n such that q* c $ ( s ) is n itself, i.e.
b .* (q* )
J(q*) = n. This moans that —1— is equal for all j, and
q j
this will mean that
b .* (q* ) = q* C
J J
Thus q* is the desired equilibruim odds vector.
The hypothesis of Theorem 1 - mainly, strict concavity - is
overly restrictive. We can weaken it to require only (weak) con-
cavity together with strict monotonicity of the utility functions
Assume, then, that the u
±
are merely concave functions of
money. For t > 0, define
w
. ( x , t ) = u . (x ) - t -X
Then w
i




' (x , t) = U . ' (x) + t e X
w .
"
(x ,t) = U ." (x) - t e X
(where, in all cases, the primes denote differentiation with
respect to x) and so we find w. is strictly concave and monotone
in x for each t > .
Suppose, then, that each bettor's utility function u.(x) is
replaced by the strictly concave w.(x;t). For each t > 0, there
is an equilibrium n-tuple q*(t). As t -0, these g*(t) will have
an accumulation point, q**. The only difficulty is that, though
all q*(t) c Q , q** could conceivably belong to dQ. Theorem 2
says this will not happen.
Theorem 2. Assume all the functions u. are concave, strictly
i
monotone increasing, and suppose Assumption Z holds. Then there
exists an equilibrium n-tuple q * * e q .
Proof : As discussed above, let q*(t) be the equilibrium
obtained with the utility functions w . ( x , t ) . Let t ,- by the
compactness of Q, the points q*(t) will have some accumulation
point q** c Q. We must show a** i DC-
Suppose, then, q e dQ . We will show that, if | q - <? | and t are
sufficiently small, q * q*(t).
In fact, if q = q*(t), then J (a) = n, where J (q) is the
set J, as described above, with u. replaced bv w.(x,t).
i i
Define e , e , c , e , as in the proof of Theorem 1, and let
e
5
= e /2 . Let S < U . ' (j).
Suppose, now, that e is the minimum of z , e , e , e , that
\q - q\ < e, and that < t < 6. We have, n ow
13
2C
v (*M -v (*f) *• r >v (*)
v (H - v (i) *<*4 <v (i) «<«* (i)
and so
!i ££ • v (ff) » v (fM£
4




(?) c K * n
and so q * q* (t) . Thus q * q**, i.e. q** e Q° as desired.
-It is easy to see that, if q*(t) is an equilibrium for each




It is possible to weaken the conditions on the utility functions
further - so that they are not strictly increasing, but only if we
strengthen condition z. Consider then
Assumption y. For all i and j, p. . > 0.
i •> i j
Theorem 3
. Assume all the utility functions are concave and
non-decreasing, and suppose Assumption y holds. Then there is an
equilibrium q* * e Q .
Proof : We consider first the trivial case in which, for each
bettor i, u.(x) is maximized at x = A. (or less). In this case,i i '
it is clear that, for any q e q° , x.. = a .q . will be optimal for
bettor i, and so every q e q° will give an equilibrium.
14
Suppose, then, that for some bettor, say bettor 1, u, is not








Clearly < r < 1 .
As before, we replace the utility functions u.(x) by
w.(x,t) = u.(x) - t e ' , and consider the equilibria q* (t) obtained
in this manner. (Theorem 1 guarantees their existence.) As t '0,
these q*(t) have an accumulation point q** c Q. If q * * e Q , it is
the desired equilibrium. We must show q* * k 3£>
.
In fact, assume q e dQ , and let k be the set of all k such
that q = 0. Let e > be such that, if \q - q~\ < e,k
^ ij < r ik
j k
for all i, all k e K, and j i K. (This can be done since all
By (15), and since r < 1, we have
X . . X . .
(24) -^ ~ -J*
q k q j
for all i, all j i K, k e K.
Since (24) holds for all i, the equilibrium condition (20)
can hold only if (24) holds as an equation throughout. This will
mean x_
±j = A j = 1 , . . . , n
Then, for k c K, j i k,














U ' (A. + ) + t e Al
1 I < r
U ' (A}-) + t e~ 1
so that, since r < 1,





and this is a contradiction. Thus q cannot be q*(t) for any t,
and therefore q * q**. We conclude that q* * e Q , and is the
desired equilibrium.
3. Examples
We consider here several examples. The first three consider
some "reasonable" utility functions; the last shows that the con-
ditions of Theorems 2 and 3 cannot be further weakened.
(a) Logarithmic utility
Assume that each bettor has a utility function




is a parameter, representing perhaps player i's reserves
In this case, the optimability conditions (10) - (11) take the
form
ij =A. if x
. . >




( 25 ) *i7- = ~y~ - K.q if positive
P 13
(26)
X = if p . . < K . q . X .i.7 ij * 3 i
1G







- z *. . - -i— *.2 *—> XJ A . 2
X
.
2 A . + K .
2 2
Substituting in (25), this gives us
x . . = (A . + K . ) p . . - K .q .
1J 1 2 27 2 J
To look for the equilibrium, we have, from (20) - (21)
m
> x . . = q .
i=l
Thus
Zj (A . + K . ) p . - q * Zj K . = q .* C
i ' "










*j* = C + £K.
2
But c = lL a , and we see that q . * is then simply a weighted
i J
average, with weights A. + K. f of the several subjective pro-
babilities p . . .
(b) Exponential utilities




(x) = -e i
where a
. is a parameter, measuring, in some sense, bettor i's
risk aversion. (Essentially, 1/a . can be thought of as representing
the sum of money which i would be "hurt" by losing.)
17
In this case, the optimality conditions (10)-(11) take the
form




a . x . . = q . (log a . - log X . ) + q . log
i x j j l i l q
if this (right side) is positive, and x . . = otherwise° 2 J
(i.e. x
. .
= if a. p.. < X .q . ) .ij l ij i j
Assuming, again, that all x. . > 0, summation with respect
to j gives us
ya . A . = log a. - log X . + /. q . lo<11 i








q. a .k i
P i ,-'
1 og ^ - 1
qk j
q. log + A
For the equilibrium odds, we add with respect to i,
obtaining















k i j l
The right side of this last expression is independent of
k, and so
V i
^ - log p - log q, /. = y
. a. * ik ^ ^ k . a 'ii ii
where y is independent of k. Then










where r. = —
,
and r is constant. Thus in this case g, * is
l a . k
l
proportional to a weighted geometric mean, with weights a., of
the probabilities p ik
(c) Linear utility .
Yet another possibility is to equate utility with money
This case was treated in detail by Gale and Eisenberg (1959)
and so we will merely refer the reader to that interesting
art icle
.
(d) A counter-example .
Let us consider a two-horse, two-bettor situation. Bettor
1 is certain horse 1 will win whereas bettor 2 feels the race is











Bettor 1's utility function does not much matter - he will



















whereas, if g > — , then 2 will choose
19
3q
*21 ' ' ~ —
3q
22
For q = q 2
- -, we would have - < x 2J < -, x 22 = 1 - x 2J .





*(g) = 1 + — if q2 < -
3q 2 1 3q i 1
V<*> - 2 - — = 2 + -J- lf *1 > J
I s V*' - 1 if ^i = i •
For an equilibrium, we must have b *(q) = 2q (since
c = a + A = 2 ) . But, from the above, we see this holds only
if g = 1. But this leads to the undesirable discontinuity on
the boundary of the simplex, and we must conclude that there is










and < X < l
(30) f(Xx + (l-r)y) > Xf(x) + (l-\)f(y).
It is strictly concave if strict inequality holds in (30) whenever
x * y and < X < 1 . A function F is convex "strictly convex]
if -f is concave [strictly concave]
.
A set s c m is convex if, for any x,y e s and < X < 1
,
Xx + (l-X)y e S.
Generally, if f is a concave function, for any g, the set
• s
q
= | x | f(x) > q |
is convex . In particular, the set of all x which maximize f(x)
is convex (though it may be empty).
If a function f is strictly concave, it need not have a
maximum. If there is a maximum, however, the maximizing point is
unique
.
If f: m "R is concave, it will be di f ferent iable almost
everywhere in its domain. Even when not different iable , however,
f has both right and left derivatives, f'(x+) and f'(x-). The
derivative is monotone non-increasing, satisfying
31(a) f (x+) < f'(x-) for all x
31(b) f (x-) < f'(y+) if y < x.
If f is strictly concave, its derivative is strictly monotone,
satisfying 31(a) and satisfying 31(b) with strict inequality.
1,t
Upper Semi-Continuity
Let x, Y be topological spaces. A set-valued mapping from
X to Y is a mapping <j> which assigns, to each x e x, a subset
<$>(x) c y. It is a correspondence if <j> (x) * p for all x e x.
The set-valued mapping
<J>
is said to be upper semi-continuous
if, whenever x -x*
, y e <J> (x ;, and y -y* then y* e ACx*;.
n ix n n
* r
Theorem . Let f be a continuous real-valued function defined
on the product space x x y. Define for x e x,




is an upper semi-continuous set-valued mapping from x to Y
If y is compact and non-empty, then
<J>
is also a correspondence.
Kakutani's Fixed-Point Theorem .
Let x be a simplex in /R , and let <j> be an upper semi-
continuous correspondence from x to x, such that, for all x, $(x)
is compact and convex. Then there is some x* e x such that
x* e 4> ( x* ) .
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